POLLUTION ABATEMENT AND CONTROL EXPENDITURE IN ROMANIA: A MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS by Caporale, Guglielmo et al.
   
 
THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE 
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
POLLUTION ABATEMENT AND CONTROL EXPENDITURE IN ROMANIA: 
A MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
By: Guglielmo Caporale, Christophe Rault, Robert Sova & 
Anamaria Sova 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 994 
June 2010 
 1
POLLUTION ABATEMENT AND CONTROL EXPENDITURE IN ROMANIA: 
A MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
Guglielmo Maria Caporale 
Brunel University (London), CESifo and DIW Berlin1 
 
Christophe Rault 
LEO (Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orléans), CESifo, IZA, and WDI2 
 
Robert Sova 
CES, Sorbonne University, A.S.E. and E.B.R.C3 
 
Anamaria Sova 
CES, Sorbonne University, and E.B.R.C4 
 
 
Abstract 
The transition process in Central and Eastern Europe was associated with growing 
environmental awareness. This paper analyses the determinants of Pollution Abatement and 
Control Expenditure (PACE) at plant level in the case of Romania using survey data and a 
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Non-Technical Summary 
 
 
Global environmental issues have acquired crucial importance in recent years.  
Pollution is responsible for decreased overall biodiversity, and the alteration of geographical 
landscapes and climatic patterns, with a negative impact on the global economy. This 
represents a momentous challenge for policy-makers. Romania, like other countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE), has been making several efforts to comply with the environmental 
legislation of the European Union (EU). Its heavy mineral and petrochemical industries being 
highly polluting, a new environmental law framework was adopted in 1995 in order to 
achieve the transition to an environmentally sustainable market economy. The new laws 
introduced a number of policy instruments, including environmental permits, charges, 
subsidies, legal liabilities and other economic incentives. Compliance has required firms to 
implement substantial changes at plant level. In particular, pollution abatement efforts have 
had an impact on both capital expenditure and operating costs.  
Early in the transition process, Romania and the other CEE countries experienced a 
decline in industrial production and a consequent decrease in pollution levels.  In subsequent 
stages, higher economic growth may lead to higher pollution, unless concerted action is taken 
to implement more effective environmental policies. Unfortunately, environmental efforts in 
Romania face the twin obstacles of severe budgetary constraints and a legacy of poor practice 
in investment and project management. In this context, innovative and effective financing 
strategies for environmental protection need to be developed or strengthened, and steps must 
be taken to ensure that scarce financial resources are allocated efficiently to address priority 
issues.  
The aim of the present study is to shed some light on the factors affecting Pollution 
Abatement and Control Expenditure (PACE) in Romania. Its contribution is threefold: first, it 
analyses the case of a transition economy, in contrast to the existing literature which mostly 
focuses on developed economies; second, it uses a database at plant level; third, it adopts a 
suitable econometric method, i.e. the Multilevel Regression Model (MRM), to investigate the 
determinants of environmental behaviour at plant level. 
Our results are generally consistent with the literature suggesting that plant 
characteristics, formal pressure through substantial regulatory actions and informal pressure 
through market incentives and community aspects may be important drivers of the level of 
plant PACE. However, unlike in the case of developed countries, we find that in Romania the 
potential for collective action in the environmental area is not significant.  Whether the 
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influence of stakeholders on PACE will strengthen as Romania completes its development 
process remains to be seen. Also, there is no evidence that environmental taxes work as 
incentives to adopt an environmental behaviour at plant level. As expected, the actions of 
regulators (command and control and liability instruments), market pressure and plant 
characteristics are the most important determinants of the level of PACE. Thus, the largest, 
most competitive and profitable private owned enterprises have made more efforts to reduce 
pollution. These findings enable us to gain a better understanding of the factors affecting the 
level of plant PACE in the case of transition economies in general and Romania in particular. 
Even partially developed formal and informal regulations appear to increase abatement 
efforts. An increase in income per capita also increases local pressure on intensive pollution 
plants. From a policy perspective, this evidence points to the need to redesign environmental 
taxes in order to achieve better outcomes. Further, measures to increase environmental 
awareness would also be useful in this respect.  
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1.  Introduction 
Global environmental issues have acquired crucial importance in recent years.  
Pollution is responsible for decreased overall biodiversity, and the alteration of geographical 
landscapes and climatic patterns, with a negative impact on the global economy. This 
represents a momentous challenge for policy-makers.  
Romania, like other countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), has been making 
several efforts to comply with the environmental legislation of the European Union (EU). Its 
heavy mineral and petrochemical industries being highly polluting, a new environmental law 
framework was adopted in 1995 in order to achieve the transition to an environmentally 
sustainable market economy. The new laws introduced a number of policy instruments, 
including environmental permits, charges, subsidies, legal liabilities and other economic 
incentives. Compliance has required firms to implement substantial changes at plant level. In 
particular, pollution abatement efforts have had an impact on both capital expenditure and 
operating costs.  
Early in the transition process, Romania and the other CEE countries experienced a 
decline in industrial production and a consequent decrease in pollution levels.  In subsequent 
stages, higher economic growth may lead to higher pollution, unless concerted action is taken 
to implement more effective environmental policies. Unfortunately, environmental efforts in 
Romania face the twin obstacles of severe budgetary constraints and a legacy of poor practice 
in investment and project management. In this context, innovative and effective financing 
strategies for environmental protection need to be developed or strengthened, and steps must 
be taken to ensure that scarce financial resources are allocated efficiently to address priority 
issues.  
The aim of the present study is to shed some light on the factors affecting Pollution 
Abatement and Control Expenditure (PACE) in Romania. Its contribution is threefold: first, it 
analyses the case of a transition economy, in contrast to the existing literature which mostly 
focuses on developed economies; second, it uses a database at plant level; third, it adopts a 
suitable econometric method, i.e. the Multilevel Regression Model (MRM), to investigate the 
determinants of environmental behaviour at plant level. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the 
relevant literature on environmental performance. Section 3 reviews the theory of 
environmental regulation focusing on the Pigouvian and Coasian approaches. Section 4 
outlines the econometric framework and presents the empirical findings. Section 5 offers 
some concluding remarks. 
 5
2. Literature Review 
The basic economic processes are production and consumption: firms transform natural 
resources, through the production process, into commodities supplied to consumers. However, 
this conversion is never perfectly efficient: by-products (residuals) are produced. When such 
residuals have no economic value they can be thought of as waste, which may lead to 
pollution.  
Thus, firms impose costs on other agents in the economy. This is a typical case of a 
negative externality. As prices do not take into account the negative effects on the 
environment, they do not reflect full production costs for the economy; to correct this form of 
market failure it is necessary to introduce environmental regulations, as otherwise there is no 
incentive for a polluting profit-maximising firm to internalise the externality (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983). When formal regulation is weak or perceived to be insufficient, communities 
may informally regulate firms indirectly or directly through bargaining, petitioning and 
lobbying. Clearly, determining the “right” amount of pollution requires evaluating its negative 
effects - the willingness to pay to reduce pollution is an obvious measure. Environmental 
issues invariably involve a trade-off between using resources for conventional goods and 
services or for environmental protection instead - i.e. how much is a consumer willing to pay 
for a particular level of an environmental good?  
Since the Brundtland Report was published in 1987 as a result of the work of the 
World Commission on Environment and Development, extensive research has been done by 
economists on how to improve environmental performance through pollution abatement, in 
some cases using capital expenditure as a proxy for environmental performance (Panayotou et 
al 1997, Ferraz and Seroa da Motta 2002, OECD 2001). Pollution abatement and control of 
residuals from production processes can be achieved either using end-of-pipe technology 
attached to a given production process, or by changing the process. Investment in the former 
does not affect the production process itself, and the amount of pollution generated; instead, it 
aims to treat pollution already generated. By contrast, investment in integrated technologies is 
synonymous with reducing the amount of potential pollutants at source, reducing the 
consumption of resources and energy, and recycling residues and used products. 
Some research has analysed specific external factors that drive companies to improve 
their environmental performance, such as regulatory regime or government support (Delmas, 
2003; Chan & Wong, 2006; Rivera, 2004; Rivera & de Leon, 2004; Rivera et al, 2006; Shin, 
2005,), pressure from local wealthy stakeholders, civil society, and foreign customers in 
Europe and Japan (Neumayer & Perkins 2004) and industry pressure (Guler et al. 2002, 
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Corbett & Kirsch, 2004; Viadiu et al., 2006). Other research has focused on the role of 
internal organisational factors such as “organisational structure and culture.” Only a few 
studies have begun integrating key organisational characteristics with institutional theory. 
This approach can yield new insights into understanding differences between firms’ 
strategies. (Seroa da Motta, 2006; Gunningham, 1995; Hoffman 2001). 
 Some other studies have analysed the implications of corruption and political 
instability for firm investment in abatement technology. Their prediction is that greater 
corruptibility increases the level of abatement technology investment. The strategic incentive 
to under-invest in pollution control technology declines when policymakers become more 
corruptible. Similarly, political instability is predicted to increase abatement technology 
investment (Fredriksson and al., 2008). Fredriksson and al. (2005) analyse the relationship 
between environmental lobbies and environmental policy in rich and developing countries, 
and find that lobbying leads to more stringent environmental policies. 
Chávez and Stranlund (2009) show that setting a uniform tax equal to the expected 
marginal damage is not generally efficient under incomplete information about firms’ 
abatement costs and damages from pollution. The efficient emissions tax rates will vary 
across firms if a regulator can use observable firm-level characteristics to gain some 
information about how the firms’ marginal abatement costs vary. 
A few more recent studies concerning the relationship between enforcement 
mechanism and firm’s compliance behaviour highlight the fact that an increase in 
enforcement efforts may provide better environmental results (Shimshack and Ward, 2008). 
Even in an industry where compliance is generally high, an increase in enforcement through 
fines can cause a significant reduction in discharges. Enforcement not only induces non-
compliant plants to become compliant, it also makes many typically over-compliant plants 
reduce discharges even further below the permitted levels. 
Almost all these empirical studies focus on the developed countries. Additional 
challenges are faced by the developing economies, including the CEE countries such as 
Romania, which underwent a transition process. Under central planning, the well-known bias 
towards heavy industry combined with a lack of incentives to economise on inputs created 
considerable waste and pollution. Thus, in the transition countries production technologies are 
substantially less efficient than in the developed economies, and therefore emissions per unit 
of output are higher. In addition to the environmental problems inherited from the period of 
central planning, transition economies have experienced various other difficulties, including 
financial and economic hardship. The adjustment to market equilibrium is a gradual process, 
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during which many variables such as provision of public goods, willingness to pay, 
technology and capital markets etc. are in disequilibrium. This creates both constraints and 
opportunities that may not be available to more “settled” economies.  
From an econometric viewpoint, the Multilevel Regression Model (MRM) is the most 
appropriate for our sample which contains hierarchical data structured in three levels (plant, 
county and region). We choose this approach because it allows to combine these levels into a 
single analytical framewok.  This is important as theory suggests that different levels are 
interrelated.  
 
3. Environmental regulation: the theoretical framework 
The impact of environmental regulation on the economy should be examined both 
theoretically and empirically. Economists thought of the problem of environmental 
degradation as one in which the economic agents impose external costs on society as a whole 
in the form of pollution. The obvious solution was seen as the introduction of a tax on the 
polluting activity internalising social costs. Thus, the study of the degradation of the 
environment introduces the concept of externality, which is one of the main arguments for  
neoclassical interventionism. External effects have been analysed in the light of the divergent 
views of Pigou and Coase respectively. 
Pigou (1920) introduced the concept of external economy as a form of service or 
disservice to others which is not paid or compensated, focusing on the divergence between 
private and social marginal products. The presence of externalities legitimised the 
intervention of the state, whose goal was to restore the equality between marginal products, 
guaranteeing the maximisation of social income. The solution lies in taxing the activity 
causing the disservice. Since the pioneering study of Pigou (1920) it has been recognised that 
a regulatory authority can internalise external costs resulting from production (emissions) by 
introducing an environmental tax based on the marginal damage resulting from the activity 
(Pigouvian tax). 
Coase (1960) called into question the assertion that the presence of externalities 
legitimates corrective government intervention, in order to restore an optimal situation in 
terms of allocation of resources. His criticism is based on demonstrating the existence of a 
spontaneously negotiated solution. This argument is the heart of his well known “Coase 
Theorem”. This shows that decentralised bargaining between sender and receiver of the 
harmful effect for the amount of compensatory payment for the nuisance can produce a 
situation corresponding to an optimal final allocation.  
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The Coasian criticism is fundamental to the neo-liberal offensive against neoclassical 
interventionism. Essentially, Coase establishes the existence of a solution to pollution 
problems by spontaneous negotiation between the concerned agents. This direct solution 
breaks with the Pigouvian approach in two ways: the recognition of the reciprocal nature of 
the harmful effects and the introduction into economic analysis of the legal concept of 
property rights. However, as the hypothesis of zero transaction costs is unrealistic, the 
Coasian solution has been marginalised in the field of environmental economics. 
In brief, in the Pigouvian approach it is the polluter which is responsible for the 
externality and the policy prescription consists in a pollution tax.  By contrast, in the Coasian 
approach the externality is assumed to be reciprocal (i.e., both polluter and polluted cause it), 
and this implies that legal rules and institutions should change to internalise it. 
Our aim is to establish whether formal (governmental) environmental regulation is 
more effective than informal ones (negotiation, community pressure) in reducing pollution in 
the case of Romania.  
 
4. Econometric Analysis 
 
4.1 Econometric method 
In the statistics literature MRM is alternatively referred to as multilevel analysis, 
hierarchical models, random coefficients models, and variance components analysis. The 
common element of all these methods is that the dependent variable is analysed as a function 
of predictors measured at the lowest level and of those measured at higher levels. The 
rationale for using the multilevel model is based on the assumption that the variation in the 
dependent variable is a function of both lower-level and higher-level factors - not only of 
individual-level attributes, but also of extra-individual factors. Besides, the relationship 
between lower- and higher-level factors and the dependent variable is not assumed to be fixed 
or constant across space or time. Therefore, the regression coefficients in micro-level models 
are not fixed, and they can vary across these factors.  
Conceptually, the model is often viewed as a hierarchical system of regression 
equations. The simplest multilevel model that can be formulated considers only two levels of 
analysis5. The analysis focuses on level-1 (individuals), whilst level-2 (group) provides the 
context for the level-1 units. For instance, in our case, level-1 units are the plants who are 
nested in different counties (level-2 units). The dependent variable (note: in Yij , i refers to 
                                                          
5 For more details concerning MRM, see Greene (2002). 
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level-1 units and j refers to level-2 units) is measured for level-1 units, since this is the 
primary level of analysis. The explanatory variables are Xij for level-1 and Zj for level-2. By 
assumption, there are J groups and in each group there are Ni individuals. 
Thus, there is a separate regression equation for each group.  
 
ijijjjij XY εββ ++= 10    with     (j = 1,2, …….J; i = 1,2,……N)      (1) 
where : 
β0 is the regression intercept; 
β1 is the regression slope for the explanatory variable X; 
εij is the residual term. 
To model group variation (this time for the level-2 units) in regression parameters 
additional equations are required, with the level-1 regression parameters as their dependent 
variables. The regression includes at least a constant, one level-2 explanatory variable and a 
disturbance.  
Thus, a typical level-2 model consists of the following equations: 
 
jjj uZ 001000 ++= µµβ  with (j = 1,2,….N)                             (2) 
jjij uZ 11110 ++= µµβ   with (j = 1,2,….N)                             (3) 
After substituting equations (2) and (3) into equation (1), one obtains: 
 
ijjijjjijijjij uXuZXXZY εµµµµ ++++++= 0111100100             (4) 
 
where: µ00 is the intercept; µ01 µ10  are the  effect of the level-2 variable Zj on level-1 Xij ; µ11  
is the cross-level interaction between the level-1 and level-2 variables. The last three terms in 
equation [4] are the disturbance terms. 
If there are P variables X at level-1 (lowest level) and Q variables Z at level-2 (highest 
level) the equations (1→4) become: 
ij
P
p
p
ijpjjij XY εββ ++= ∑
=1
0                                                                                    (1a) 
j
Q
q
q
joqj uZu 0
1
000 ++= ∑
=
µβ                                                                                   (2a) 
pj
Q
q
q
jpqppj uZ ++= ∑
=1
0 µµβ                                                                                  (3a) 
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where: 
µ are the regression coefficients (fixed parts of the model – they do not change across 
groups); 
u are the residuals at the group level; 
ε are the residuals at the individual level. The residuals u and ε are the random or stochastic 
part of the model. 
The multilevel model can be extended to more than two levels of analysis. The 
parameters at the highest level are always assumed to be fixed. A multilevel model extended 
to a greater number of levels produces structures that are even more complex and implies 
more complex disturbance term. Recent advances in computational power and software 
packages allows the analysis of at least three-level models, and even nine levels, but the 
interpretation of complex multi-level models is very difficult. That is why more than two 
levels should not be included unless one has a clear rationale for doing so and strong priors 
about the nature of the effects. 
 The standard techniques for combining data of different levels often break down, 
while multilevel methods allows to take into consideration their relationships and at the same 
time avoid the pitfalls associated with the traditional methods of dummy variable models and 
standard interactive approaches (see Jones and Steenbergen (2002) for more details 
concerning the multilevel methods). 
 
4.2 Model specification 
The econometric model used here considers four determinants of pollution 
expenditure: plant characteristics, market incentives, communities’ characteristics and 
regulation intensity. In our analysis we focus on the regulatory variables in order to explain 
pollution abatement through the control expenditure at plant level. The dependent variable is 
plant environmental pollution expenditure (PACE) defined as: 
  
),,,( REGULATORYCOMMUNITYMARKETPLANTfPACE =                                         (5)   
 
Plant - Plant characteristics, 
Market – Market incentives, 
Community - Community characteristics,  
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Regulatory - Regulatory intensity. 
 
Plant characteristics included in the analysis are the competitiveness of the firm, 
ownership, size, location, the technology used and external financing. Competitiveness and 
profitability are important factors as they represent the willingness and ability of the firm to 
abate pollution. Other relevant variables are solvency, liquidity and the debt ratio which are 
indices of financial stability and can provide more information about the ability of plants to 
invest in pollution abatement technology. 
Regarding ownership, we consider three categories, namely enterprises with state 
capital (state-owned enterprises), with private capital (privately owned enterprises) and with 
mixed capital. We also distinguish between domestic and foreign enterprises. 
Plant size is proxied by turnover and is a measure of the ability of the firm to invest in 
order to abate pollution. The geographical location can be urban or rural. Eight regions are 
considered. The technology used in the production process allows to distinguish between 
intensive pollution sectors (dirty sectors) and the non-pollutant sectors (clean sectors).  
It is also important to take into account other economic factors and market 
characteristics of the environment where plants develop their activities. Thus, income per 
capita at purchasing power parity at national and regional level is included as a measure of the 
standard of living. People from regions with high income tend to be better educated, more 
informed about environmental issues and more active in abating pollution. 
Government’s pressure or formal regulation is included in the form of environmental 
taxes and penalties, environmental subsidies and legislation on air and water pollution 
abatement at regional level. As for community pressure or informal regulation, we consider 
non-governmental organisations (NGO) at regional and county level which can exert 
important pressure on plants to abate pollution and use cleaner technologies. 
 
Table 1 provides a list of variable definitions and a summary of theoretical priors for their 
effects on pollution abatement. 
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Table 1 Variable Definitions and Expected Signs 
Variables Definitions Sign
Plant characteristic variables 
Profitit Disposable profit of plant i in year t as a measure of 
competitiveness and profitability; 
+ 
Productit Plant productivity of plant i in year t as a measure of 
economic performance; 
+ 
Debtit Debt ratio of plant i in year t – a measure of a company's 
financial leverage;  
- 
Turnoverit Turnover of plant i  in year t ; plant activity size defined as 
turnover; 
+ 
Svbit Solvency of plant i  in year t as a measure of financial 
performance  
+ 
Lqtit Liquidity of plant i  in year t as a measure of financial 
performance; 
+ 
CSit Ownership of the plant i in year t.  The dummy variable takes 
value 1 if the plant is a state-owned enterprise  and 0 
otherwise; 
+/- 
CPit Ownership of the plant i in year t.  The dummy variable takes 
value 1 if the plant is a privately owned enterprise  and 0 
otherwise; 
 
+/- 
CMit Ownership of the plant i in year t.  The dummy variable takes 
value 1 if the plant has mixed capital and 0 otherwise; 
+/- 
Frgnit Foreign plants. The dummy variable takes value 1 for foreign 
enterprises  and 0 for  domestic enterprises; 
+/- 
Locit  Geographical location of the plant i in year t according to the 
degree of urbanization. The dummy variable takes value 1 if 
the plant is located in an urban area and 0 if   is located in 
rural area; 
 
 
+/- 
Efnit Foreign financing aid of plant i in year t.  +/- 
Market incentive variables 
Isoit ISO 14001 certification, indicating environmental 
management adoption by the plant i The dummy variable 
takes value 1 if the plant is certified ISO and 0 otherwise; 
+ 
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Markit Listing on Bucharest Stock Exchange (BSE) of plant i in 
year t, proxy for the firm’s visibility. The dummy variable 
takes value 1 if the plant is listed at BSE and 0 otherwise; 
+ 
PCIkt Per capita income for each region k in the year t , a proxy for 
local informal  regulatory pressure, education and  citizen 
activism  
+ 
CRPt Corruption index of the country in year t - 
Community characteristics variables 
UnEmpjt Unemployment rate of county j  in year t as a proxy for 
population welfare ; 
- 
RSHkt Population with university studies of region k  in year t as a  
proxy for population skills. 
+ 
Regulatory intensity variables 
PollSectit Pollution industry sectors as a proxy for intensity of 
regulation and environmental policy instruments. Dummy 
variable which takes value 1  if the production of the plant i 
in year t is dirty and 0 otherwise; 
+ 
EnvNGOjt Number of environmental non-governmental organisations of 
county  j  in year t; 
+ 
Locpresit The existence of the local pressure on the plant i in year t. 
Dummy variable which takes value 1  if the plant i in year t 
was subject to a local pressure  and 0 otherwise; 
+ 
EnvGuardkt Environmental penalties in region k  in the year t, proxy for 
the formal regulatory pressure to adopt an environmental 
behaviour- liability environmental policy instruments; 
+ 
EnvTxit Environmental taxes of plant i  in year t , proxy for the 
economic incentives to adopt an environmental behaviour – 
economic environmental policy instruments; 
+ 
EnvSubit Environmental subsidies of plant i  in year t, policy 
instruments to promote plant environmental behaviour- 
economic environmental policy instruments; 
+ 
Acomt Communitary aquis ; Dummy variable which takes value 1  
if the country adopted the aquis in year t  and 0 otherwise;  
+ 
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Thus, the econometric specification used is the following: 
itt
ititktitjt
itjttktit
ititititititititit
ititititit
uAcom
EnvSubEnvTxEnvGuardLocpresEnvNGO
PolSectUnEmpCRPPCIMark
IsoEfnLocFrgnCMCPCSLqtSvb
TurnoverDebtoductofitPACE
++
++++++
++++++
++++++++++
+++++=
23
2221201918
1716151413
1212111098765
43210
)log()log()log()log(
)log()log()log()log(
)log(
)log()log()log(Pr)log(Pr)log(
β
βββββ
βββββ
βββββββββ
βββββ
 (6) 
 
where:  PACEit = pollution abatement expenditure incurred by plant i in year t and uit is the 
error term. Some details about our sample and the data sources are provided below. 
 
4.3 Data 
The analysis has been carried out for Romania in the period 2002 – 2005. The data are 
taken from the yearly survey of plant pollution abatement effort conducted by the Romanian 
National Institute of Statistic which inquires about capital expenditures and operating cost 
associated with pollution abatement efforts. Data in the survey are tabulated by industry.  
The data are in the form of a panel providing environmental and financial information 
at establishment level (on pollution abatement and control expenditure, environmental taxes 
and subsidies) and community characteristics and regulation intensity data at county level for 
the period 2002-2005. The sample contains plants covering almost all industrial sectors. We 
selected only the plants with continuous activity over the sample period (1422 plants).  
The establishment characteristics (economic and financial information) are taken from 
plant financial reports. Also, we identified the firms that were traded on the capital market 
and listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange, and those certified ISO 14001, using information 
from the Romanian Accreditation Association. The community characteristics were obtained 
from the Romanian National Institute of Statistics, except for the number of environmental 
ONG which comes from the Ministry of Environment. Using the information from 
Environmental Guard we constructed a proxy variable for regulation intensity (environmental 
penalties levied). 
 
4.4 Empirical results and policy implications 
First, we run a regression for total environmental expenditure, and then we model the 
pollution abatement effort separately for air and water. Subsequently, we also analyse 
pollution abatement at the regional level, so as to highlight the different determinants for each 
region. 
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4.4.1 Abatement pollution effort 
The econometric results from the model are reported in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Econometric results of determinants of abatement pollution effort 
OLS OLS OLS MRM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Variables 
PACEit PACEit PACEit PACEit 
0.087 0.092 0.090 0.075 Productit 
(5.19)*** (5.51)*** (5.36)*** (4.58)*** 
0.032 -0.040 0.052 0.024 Svbit 
(0.66) (0.82) (1.08) (0.50) 
0.150 0.122 0.125 0.103 Lqtit 
(4.57)*** (3.70)*** (3.63)*** (3.02)*** 
0.837 0.843 0.851 0.795 Turnoverit 
(48.03)*** (48.06)*** (48.19)*** (4.51)*** 
0.042 0.046 0.144 0.138 Profitit 
(3.04)*** (3.34)*** (3.20)*** (2.79)*** 
0.437 0.412 0.387 0.375 Frgnit 
(5.15)*** (4.85)*** (4.57)*** (4.03)*** 
0.455 0.492 0.510 0.492 ISOit 
(5.23)*** (5.65)*** (5.85)*** (5.52)*** 
0.858 0.831 0.826 0.800 Markit 
(22.87)*** (22.12)*** (22.02)*** (20.52)*** 
0.199 0.196 0.192 0.182 PollSectit 
(6.64)*** (6.54)*** (6.44)*** (5.32)*** 
0.295 0.294 0.294 0.293 EnvSubit 
(10.45)*** (10.41)*** (10.45)*** (10.58)*** 
0.393 0.390 0.382 0.320 Efnt 
(6.91)*** (6.86)*** (6.75)*** (6.12)*** 
-0.328 -0.327 -0.325 -0.324 Debtit 
(6.36)*** (6.35)*** (6.33)*** (6.00)*** 
-0.628 -0.587 -0.617 -0.362 CSit 
(5.99)*** (5.60)*** (5.90)*** (6.38)*** 
0.347 0.338 0.329 0.210 CMit 
(4.91)*** (4.77)*** (4.66)*** (2.70)*** 
0.324 0.328 0.336 0.377 CPit 
(4.09)*** (4.14)*** (4.25)*** (4.31)*** 
0.151 0.158 0.151 0.425 EnvTXit 
(15.85)*** (16.42)*** (15.58)*** (4.50)*** 
- -0.145 -0.076 -0.014 UnEmpjt   
 (1.63) (0.73) (1.34) 
- 0.168 -0.064 -0.073 Locit      
 (1.67)* (1.14) (0.13) 
- 0.066 -0.050 0.072 EnvNGOjt    
 (1.49) (1.05) (1.29) 
- -0.061 0.203 0.126 LocPresit  
 (1.39) (0.11) (1.03) 
PCIkt        - - 1.481 5.277 
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  (7.71)*** (5.53)*** 
- - 0.085  0.020 Acomt 
  (2.53)** (1.61)* 
- - 0.035  0.255 EnvGUARDkt 
  (2.59)*** (6.51)*** 
- - -0.126 -0.069 CRPt 
  (2.11)** (1.20)* 
-3.044 -3.669 1.518 20.071 Constant 
(20.29)*** (20.56)*** (2.01)** (5.39)*** 
Observations 5688 5688 5688 5688 
R-squared 0.30 0.31 0.31 - 
Log restricted-likelihood - - - -34871.95 
Sd_reg - - - 0.8762831 
IC_reg - - - 0.33 
Sd_jud - - -   0.7484896 
IC_jud - - - 0.26 
Sd_residual - - - 1.260319 
LR test vs. OLS chi2 - - - 807.22 
Prob>chi2    (0.00) 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note: the regressions (1→3) are performed using the ordinary least squares (OLS) and 4 is performed with 
multilevel regression (MRM). 
Sd_reg = Standard deviation at the region level (3); 
Sd_jud = Standard deviation at the county level (2); 
Sd_residual = Standard deviation at the plant level (1); 
IC_reg = Intraclass_ correlation (region – fiscal) =
22
2
__
_
residualSdregSd
regSd
+
 
IC_jud = Intraclass_ correlation (county – fiscal) =
22
2
__
_
residualSdjudSd
judSd
+
 
If the interclass correlation (IC) approaches 0 then the grouping by counties (or regions) is not of any use (one 
might as well run a simple regression). If IC approaches 1 then there is no variance to explain at the individual 
level, every unit being the same. 
 
We focus in particular on the results obtained through the multilevel method (column 
4). It can be seen that the signs of the statistically significant variables are in general as 
expected. The large and successful firms with capital availability are more likely to adopt an 
environmental behaviour and invest in environmental protection. The competitiveness 
variables have a positive and significant effect. Thus, if the plants are more competitive (i.e., 
profitable) they abate pollution more aggressively, presumably because they can afford to 
invest more to improve their environmental performance. Plants with good solvency and 
liquidity and not too indebted can invest more in cleaner technologies. Plant productivity is a 
measure of competitiveness. Size also matters As already mentioned, this is proxied by 
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turnover. From our results it is clear that the largest plants are more aggressive in abating 
pollution. 
Plant ownership also plays an important role.  We find a negative correlation between 
state-owned plants and abatement efforts and a positive one in the case of privately owned or 
mixed capital enterprises. Most enterprises in our sample have private or mixed capital, the 
state owned plants representing only 5 % of the total. After 1989, Romania privatised many 
state owned enterprises. This wave of privatisation has increased the competitiveness and 
efficiency of plants and thus has improved their environmental performance. Our results show 
clearly that private enterprises (domestic or foreign) make more significant abatement efforts. 
Concerning the relationship between geographical location and abatement efforts, our results 
show that clean technologies are more common in the urban areas, whilst more pollution is 
found in the rural ones. Financial or foreign aid is also positively correlated with abatement 
effort.  
Market pressure from consumers, investors and competing firms, estimated by the 
adoption of ISO 14001 and by the listing on the Bucharest Stock Exchange, has a significant 
positive impact. Good visibility of a plant and the adoption of environmental management 
standards are two important determinants of abatement efforts and indicate that the 
management of these plants are more responsive to environmental regulations. 
There is a positive relationship between regional per capita income and abatement 
effort. Our sample includes eight regions as specified in table A1 in the appendix. Regions 
with a higher income are more environmentally aware and invest more in pollution 
abatement. The corruption index is instead negatively correlated with abatement effort.  
Community groups, proxied by unemployment and the number of environmental non-
governmental organisations, have no statistically significant impact on PACE. EnvNGOs do 
not appear to have an important role either. In general, in the transition economies the concern 
for the environment is not a top priority for the community, which is confronted with 
economical and financial problems.  
 Concerning the government pressure on plants we used three proxies for formal 
regulatory pressure, namely environmental penalties, taxes and subsidies. Public authorities 
which are concerned with regulatory enforcement and monitoring are critical factors 
influencing plants’ decisions to take an environmental approach and undertake environmental 
investment. Environmental penalties and subsidies are found to have a statistically significant 
positive impact, whilst environmental taxes are also statistically significant but have a low 
impact.  These results show that, although formal regulations are still only partially 
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developed, they have measurably beneficial effects on abatement efforts in the case of 
Romania.  
 
4.4.2. Water and Air Pollution Abatement Effort 
Environmental standards are typically drafted by research institutes or ministries. A 
system of environmental authorisations has been created consisting of environmental 
agreements and environmental permits. All environmental permits specify that enterprises are 
responsible for monitoring emissions.  The authorities (environmental protection agencies) 
have the right to amend, suspend and revoke environmental authorisations but they prefer to 
be more collaborative to obtain compliance. If an enterprise is unable to meet the discharge 
levels specified in its permits, a plan is developed containing the steps that must be 
undertaken within a specified time. There are penalties for exceeding permitted emission, but 
these are not linked to pollution quantities and are not an effective deterrent.  
Water resources in Romania are managed according to the principals of integrated 
water management. Therefore, policies to promote sustainability try specifically to 
incorporate linkages between water quality and water quantity. These are potentially 
important, because excessive usage can lower underground and surface water levels and 
increase concentration of contaminants.  
Water charges exist in Romania, both for direct consumption or use and for 
discharges. Their aim is to encourage the sustainable use of this resource and to generate 
revenues to finance water supply and sewage treatment and disposal. They were introduced at 
the beginning of 1991 and rates are indexed quarterly. There are separate national prices for 
each category and user of raw water, with the industry sector paying more than agriculture, 
and agriculture paying more than households. 
Penalties are levied on twenty substances divided into two general categories. The first 
contains substances such as chlorine, sulphates, nitrates, detergents for which allowable levels 
are established to meet concentrations standards. The second group contains substances such 
as mercury, pesticides, radioactive residues for which no discharges are permitted. 
Next, we estimate separate regressions for water and air pollution abatement effort. The 
variables are generally the same as in the previous regression, but there are a few additional 
ones specific to water and air respectively. Thus, the econometric specifications are the 
following: 
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• for water pollution abatement 
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where : PACEwit =  water pollution abatement expenditure incurred by plant i in year t; 
EnvTxwit = environmental taxes incurred by plant i in year t for water pollution abatement; 
EnvSubwit = environmental subsidies received by plant i in year t for water pollution 
abatement; Efnwit = foreign financing aid received by plant i in year t for water pollution 
abatement; LWwt = number of laws adopted concerning water pollution in year t and uit – 
error term. 
 
• for  air pollution abatement  
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where : PACEait = air pollution abatement expenditure incurred by plant i in year t for air ; 
EnvTxait = environmental taxes incurred by plant i in year t for air pollution abatement; 
EnvSubait = environmental subsidies received by plant i in year t for air pollution abatement; 
Efnait = foreign financing aid received by plant i in year t for air pollution abatement; LWat = 
number of laws adopted concerning air pollution in year t and uit – error term. 
The econometric results are reported in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Econometric results for air and water pollution abatement effort 
  
AIR ABATEMENT EFFORT
(MRM) 
WATER ABATEMENT EFFORT
(MRM) 
Variables Coefficient z Coefficient z 
Productit 0.078 ( -4.69)*** 0.081 (-4.85)*** 
Svbit 0.016 ( -0.32) 0.009 (-0.19) 
Lqtit  0.108 ( -3.13)*** 0.095 ( -2.73)*** 
Turnoverit 0.772 ( 41.37)*** 0.811 ( 43.04)*** 
Profitit 0.037 ( 2.92)*** 0.041 ( 2.95)*** 
Frgnit 0.331 ( -3.51)*** 0.349 (-3.64)*** 
ISOit 0.489 ( 5.42)*** 0.556 ( 6.12)*** 
Markit 0.858 ( 19.27)*** 0.936 ( 20.66)*** 
Debtit -0.336 ( -6.15)*** -0.335 (-6.06)*** 
CSit -0.762 ( 6.29)*** -0.908 (7.37)*** 
CMit 0.172 ( 2.18)** 0.246 (3.07)*** 
CPit 0.363 ( -4.10)*** 0.346 ( -3.82)*** 
EnvTXwit - - 0.004 (-0.26) 
PollSectwit - - 0.148 ( 4.50)*** 
EnvSubwit  - - 0.292 (7.29)*** 
Efnwit - - 0.341 ( 4.56)*** 
LWwt - - 0.211 (3.27)*** 
EnvTXait 0.285 (16.26)*** - - 
PollSectait 0.215 ( 5.46)*** - - 
EnvSubait 0.244 ( 5.70)*** - - 
Efnait 0.370 ( 3.92)*** - - 
LWat 0.322 (6.72)*** - - 
PCIkt        3.542 ( -3.46)*** 4.358 ( -4.22)*** 
UnEmpjt  -0.611 (-1.21) -0.819 (1.61)* 
EnvNGOjt    0.007 ( -0.61) 0.089 (-1.16) 
EnvGUARDkt  0.301 ( 6.61)*** 0.345 (7.54)*** 
Constant 2.687 (-0.61) 5.426 (-1.22) 
R-squared 0.67 - 0.78 - 
Observations 5688 - 5688 - 
Log restricted-likelihood -32175.62 - -30117.35 - 
Sd_reg 0.8925334 - 0.9125631 - 
IS_reg 0.33 - 0.30 - 
Sd_jud   0.6253471 -   0.7285243 - 
IS_jud 0.16 - 0.21 - 
Sd_residual 1.413562 - 1.394265 - 
906.13 - 786.34 - LR test vs. OLS chi2 
Prob>chi2 (0.00) - (0.00) - 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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One can see that the determinants of air and water pollution abatement effort are 
approximately the same and have the same signs as before. Environmental taxes seem to be 
more important for the former, indicating that formal regulation plays a bigger role in the case 
of air pollution abatement effort, while for the latter environmental taxes becomes 
insignificant. For both the effects of informal regulation are weak.  
 
4.4.3 Abatement effort at the regional level 
Next, we estimate equation (6) at the regional level, still carrying out multilevel analysis 
(MRM).  The variable added is RSH, which is a proxy for human resource quality. The results 
are displayed in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Econometric results of the abatement pollution effort at the regional level (eight regions) by multilevel regression 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Variables 
PACEit PACEit PACEit PACEit PACEit PACEit PACEit PACEit 
0.122 0.179 0.140 0.130 0.071 0.096 0.021 0.053 Productit 
(2.86)*** (4.54)*** (3.31)*** (2.15)** (1.67)* (2.52)** (0.51) (1.28) 
-0.098 -0.008 0.036 -0.038 -0.064 -0.037 -0.143 0.163 Svbit 
 (0.81) (0.07) (0.34) (0.26) (0.56) (0.32) (1.19) (1.30) 
0.142 0.034 0.136 0.045 0.025 0.146 0.015 0.188 Lqtit  
 (1.65)* (0.42) (1.71)* (0.41) (0.30) (1.88)* (0.18) (2.02)** 
0.755 0.672 0.578 0.551 0.390 0.611 0.706 0.573 Turnoverit 
(16.74)*** (15.00)*** (14.36)*** (10.30)*** (9.69)*** (14.62)*** (14.45)*** (11.52)*** 
0.043 0.097 0.074 0.114 0.046 0.074 0.022 0.112 Profitit 
(1.25) (2.92)*** (2.14)** (2.37)** (1.31) (2.28)** (0.64) (0.34) 
0.214 0.443 0.010 0.486 0.111 0.610 0.407 0.121 Frgnit 
(0.77) (2.07)** (0.05) (1.75)* (0.49) (3.41)*** (2.13)** (0.59) 
0.046 0.214 0.185 0.228 0.507 0.434 -0.058 0.203 ISOit 
(0.20) (0.90) (0.99) (1.01) (2.06)** (1.86)* (0.24) (1.11) 
0.552 0.345 0.461 0.690 0.643 0.465 0.654 0.384 Markit 
 (6.59)*** (3.70)*** (5.63)*** (6.42)*** (5.50)*** (5.54)*** (6.74)*** (3.84)*** 
0.004 0.153 0.029       0.009 0.104 0.150 0.042 0.044 PollSectit 
(0.06) (2.16)** (0.42) (0.09) (1.39) (2.34)** (0.59) (0.54) 
-0.035 0.217 0.042 0.124 0.026 0.076 0.066 0.081 EnvSubit  
(0.52) (2.48)** (0.50) (1.51) (0.36) (0.91) (0.96) (1.54) 
0.041 0.097 0.153 0.210 0.001 0.195 0.125 0.015 Efnit 
(0.43) (0.62) (0.42) (0.97) (0.78.) (1.66)* (0.85) (0.15) 
0.012 -0.022 0.147 0.015 0.123 0.031 0.026 0.057 EnvTXit 
(0.51) (0.97) (6.24)*** (0.45) (4.45)*** (2.32)** (1.71)* (2.13)** 
-0.343 0.050 -0.305 -0.072 -0.253 -0.295 -0.145 -0.482 Debtit 
 (2.46)** (0.48) (2.93)*** (0.38) (1.84)* (2.62)*** (1.05) (3.62)*** 
-1.028 -0.272 -0.677 -0.020 0.408 -0.121 -0.367 -0.253 CSit 
(3.15)*** (1.11) (2.84)*** (0.07) (1.48) (0.50) (1.59) (0.91) 
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0.316 0.348 0.192 -0.082 -0.383 0.057 0.293 0.416 CMit 
(1.49) (1.78)* (1.15) (0.32) (2.38)** (0.34) (1.73)* (2.59)*** 
0.061 0.332 0.063       0.688 0.438 0.561 0.292 0.157 CPit 
(0.24) (1.84)* (0.34) (2.82)*** (1.97)** (3.63)*** (1.74)* (0.74) 
-2.000 -2.546 -1.378 -0.751 2.900 -0.330 -1.809 -2.722 Unempjt   
(2.68)*** (5.41)*** (3.25)*** (0.70) (4.79)*** (0.98) (3.92)*** (1.57) 
-1.388 -2.476 0.764 -5.483 -2.707 -2.896 -6.880 -7.175 Locit   
(6.91)*** (9.43)*** (1.41) (4.19)*** (2.67)*** (3.96)*** (11.04)*** (2.50)** 
0.017 0.072 0.067 0.032 0.148 1.096 2.241 6.431 EnvNGOjt  
(1.30) (0.65) (1.20) (0.44) (2.64)*** (2.13)** (3.72)*** (6.42)*** 
0.010      0.0178 0.106 0.154 0.102 0.094 0.131 0.197 Locpresit 
(0.09) (0.30) (1.00) (0.94) (1.90)* (2.01)* (2.43)** (2.10)** 
7.673 11.869 10.529 -7.470 17.110 13.651 20.128 23.993 PCIkt        
(2.78)*** (1.73)* (1.42) (1.59) (3.02)*** (2.82)*** (4.16)*** (1.76)* 
0.758 0.213 0.683 0.229 0.846 1.010 5.005 0.638 EnvGUARDkt 
(1.31) (0.70) (1.43) (0.48) (3.50)*** (3.55)*** (4.24)*** (5.46)*** 
0.091 0.101 0.113 0.107 0.187 0.162 0.178 0.253 RSHkt 
(1.31) (1.87)* (1.43) (1.98)* (2.12)** (1.73)* (1.82)* (2.48)*** 
-67.230 37.000 22.931 22.278 -73.277 97.973 -354.923 125.385 Constant 
(2.26)** (1.40) (1.07) (1.08) (3.98)*** (3.71)*** (4.72)*** (1.91)* 
Observations 816 632 760 508 568 748 936 720 
R-squared 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.48 0.52 0.50 0.46 0.42 
Log restricted-likelihood -30245.12 -32175.62 -29413.21 -26625.67 -34215.54 -34414.13 -29313.25 -31442.46 
Sd_reg 0.7932341 0.8721531 0.9125463 0.8874215 0.9022153 0.7985691 0.8751243 0.9075812 
IS_reg 0.24 0.30 0.34 0.30 0.36 0.30 0.28 0.33 
Sd_residual 1.413562 1.325642 1.275891 1.346521 1.192678 1.215642 1.402278 1.278954 
806.18 779.21 675.32 917.45 825.30 715.89 698.74 914.38 LR test vs. OLS chi2 
Prob>chi2 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Regions:      1 = North - East                4 = South - West                      7 = Centre    
                    2 = South – East                5 = West                                   8 = Bucharest - Ilfov 
                    3 = South                           6 = North – West 
 
As expected, in the regions with high income (West, Centre and Bucharest-Ilfov) 
informal pressure is more important and the population more reactive. Thus, local pressure and 
ONGs have a significant impact on pollution abatement. In contrast, in the poorer regions 
(North-East, South -West) informal pressure is weak, the population being less educated and 
having limited access to information.  
Besides, formal regulations have a different impact on the eight regions. Specifically, 
environmental taxes and penalties are statistically insignificant for the low-income regions and 
become significant for the regions with high income per capita.  Bucharest-Ilfov has the highest 
income per capita, the North-East region the lowest.  Bucharest-Ilfov is also characterised by 
the availability of qualified human resources, and the presence of a number of EnvNGOs. 
Moreover, almost all plants in this region are clean (see table A2). In contrast, the poorest 
region is characterised by a high unemployment rate, a low percentage of skilled population 
and a low number of EnvNGOs. Plants polluting more are located in poorer regions (see table 
A3 and A4).  
Overall, although Romania has improved its environmental performance considerably, 
formal and informal regulation are still only partially developed due to the difficulties of 
economic transition, and heterogeneity across regions remains considerable. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has tested some hypotheses formulated in the environmental literature about 
PACE patterns at plant level. Its original contribution is to examine them using survey data in 
the case of a country such as Romania, which has undergone a process of economic and 
political transition and has been a EU member since 2007; also, we apply an appropriate 
econometric method, namely MRM.  
Our results are generally consistent with the literature suggesting that plant 
characteristics, formal pressure through substantial regulatory actions and informal pressure 
through market incentives and community aspects may be important drivers of the level of 
plant PACE. However, unlike in the case of developed countries, we find that in Romania the 
potential for collective action in the environmental area is not significant.  Whether the 
influence of stakeholders on PACE will strengthen as Romania completes its development 
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process remains to be seen. Also, there is no evidence that environmental taxes work as 
incentives to adopt an environmental behaviour at plant level. As expected, the actions of 
regulators (command and control and liability instruments), market pressure and plant 
characteristics are the most important determinants of the level of PACE. Thus, the largest, 
most competitive and profitable private owned enterprises have made more efforts to reduce 
pollution. 
These findings enable us to gain a better understanding of the factors affecting the level 
of plant PACE in the case of transition economies in general and Romania in particular. Even 
partially developed formal and informal regulations appear to increase abatement efforts. An 
increase in income per capita also increases local pressure on intensive pollution plants. From a 
policy perspective, this evidence points to the need to redesign environmental taxes in order to 
achieve better outcomes. Further, measures to increase environmental awareness would also be 
useful in this respect.  
 26
References 
 
 [1] Chan E S W, Wong S C K (2006), “Motivations for ISO 14001 in the hotel industry”, 
Tourism Management, 27(3), 481-492 
 [2] Chávez C, Stranlund J (2009), "A Note on Emissions Taxes and Incomplete Information," 
Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource 
Economists, 44(1), 137-144. 
[3] Coase R H (1960), “The problem of social cost”, Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1-44 
[4] Corbett C J, Kirsch D A (2004), “Response to “Revisiting ISO 14000 Diffusion: A New 
“Look” at the Drivers of Certification’’, Production and Operations Management, 13(3), 268-
271. 
[5] Delmas M (2003), “In search of ISO: an Institutional Perspective on the Adoption of 
International Management Standard”, Standford Graduate School of Business, Working Paper 
1784 
[6] DiMaggio P J, Powell W W (1983), “The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and 
collective rationality in organizational fields”, American Sociological Review, 48(2), 147-160. 
[7] Ferraz C, Seroa da Motta R (2002), “Regulação Mercado ou Pressão Social? Os 
Determinantes do Investimento Ambiental na Industria”, Proceedings ANPEC- XXIX Encontro 
Nacional de Economia Salvador  
[8] Fredriksson P G, Wollscheid, Jim R. (2008), "The political economy of investment: The 
case of pollution control technology," European Journal of Political Economy, 24(1), 53-72. 
[9] Fredriksson P G, Neumayer E, Damania R, Gates S (2005), “Environmentalism, 
democracy, and pollution control”, Journal of environmental economics and management, 49 
(2). 343 -365. 
[10] Greene WH (2002), “Econometric Analysis”, Prentice Hall New Jersey  
[11] Guler I, Guillen M F, MacPherson J M (2002), “Global competition institutions and the 
diffusion of organizational practices: the international spread of the ISO 9000 quality 
certificates”, Administrative Science Quarterly, 47(2), 207-232   
[12] Gunningham N (1995), “Environment self-regulation and the chemical industry: Assessing 
Responsible Care”, Law and Policy 17(1), 57-108   
[13] Hoffman A J (2001), “Linking organizational and field-level analyses – The diffusion of 
corporate environmental practice”, Organization & Environment, 14(2), 133-156  
[14] Jones B S, Steenburgen M R (2002), “Modelling Multilevel data structures”, American 
Journal of Political Science, 46(1),218-237. 
 27
[15] Neumayer E, Perkins R (2004), “What explains the uneven take-up of ISO 14001 at the 
global level? A panel-data analysis”, Environment and Planning, 36(5), 823-839 
[16] OECD (2001), “The firm, the environment and Public Policy Working Party on National 
Environmental Policy”, ENV/EPOC/WPNET 31/FINAL  
[17] Panayotou T, Schatzki T, Limvorapitak Q (1997), “Differential industry response to 
formal and informal environmental regulations in newly industrializing economies: The case of 
Thailand”, Mimeo Harvard Institute for International Development  
[18] Pigou A C, {1920), “The Economics of Welfare”, Macmillan, London 
[19] Rivera J (2004), “Institutional pressures and voluntary environmental behaviour in 
developing countries: Evidence from the Costa Rican hotel industry”, Society and Natural 
Resources, 17(9), 779-797 
[20] Rivera J, de Leon P (2004), “Is greener whiter? Voluntary Environmental Performance of 
Western Ski Areas”, Policy Studies Journal, 32 (3), 417-437 
[21] Rivera J, de Leon P, Koerber C (2006), “Is greener whiter yet? The sustainable slopes 
program after five years”, Policy Studies Journal, 34(2), 195-221 
[22] Seroa da Motta R (2006), “Analyzing the environmental performance of the Brazilian 
industrial sector”, Ecological Economics, 57(2), 269-281. 
[23] Shin S (2005), “The Role of the Government in Voluntary Environmental Protection 
Schemes: The Case of ISO 14001 in China”, Issues & Studies, 41(4), 141-173 
[24] Shimshack, J P, Ward M B (2008), "Enforcement and over-compliance," Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management, 55(1), 90-105, 
[25] Vastag G, Corbett C J, Kirsch D A (2004), “Revisiting ISO 14000 Diffusion: A New 
‘Look’ at the Drivers of Certification/Response”, Production and Operations Management, 13 
(3),268-271 
 [26] Viadiu M F, Casadesús F M, Saizarbitoria M H (2006), “ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 
standards: An international diffusion model”, International Journal of Operations and 
Production Management 26(1-2), 141-165 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28
Appendix 
 
Table A1: Evolution of per capita income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
year
Region 2002 2003 2004 2005 
1 North - East 4970 5703 6442 6970
2 South - East 5967 6755 7465 7949
3 South 5563 6398 7222 7833
4 South -West 5553 6677 7177 7615
5 Vest 7527 8903 10132 11128
6 North -West 6538 7618 8537 9263
7 Centre 7505 8454 9429 10093
8 Bucharest - Ilfov 14467 15298 17091 17902
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Table A2: Distribution of plants by region and ownership - 2005 
  
Region 
 
 
 
Total 
Plants 
 
 
Dirty 
Plants
 
 
Domestic 
Plants 
 
 
Foreign
Plants 
 
 
Air 
Pollution
Plants 
 
Water 
Pollution 
Plants 
 
Air and 
Water 
Pollution
Plants 
Others 
Pollution
Plants 
 
State 
capital 
Plants 
 
Private 
capital 
Plants 
 
Mix 
capital 
Plants 
 
1 North - East 618 409 380 29 66 204 84 55 16 372 21
2 South - East 530 351 327 24 38 181 79 53 15 314 22
3 South 608 397 344 53 48 204 90 55 28 335 32
4 South -West 391 259 233 26 32 141 51 35 20 222 17
5 Vest 476 304 240 64 37 165 61 41 30 243 31
6 North -West 654 424 365 59 64 203 96 61 24 364 37
7 Centre 669 444 390 54 63 202 108 71 26 368 50
8 Bucharest - Ilfov 520 275 205 70 33 128 75 39 27 209 40
 Total 4466 2863 2484 379 381 1428 644 410 186 2427 250
 
 
 
Table A3: Characteristics of the regions - 2005 
 
Regions 
 
 
Per capita 
Income 
(RON/year) 
Unemployment
rate  
(%) 
Population
 
 
Density of 
Population 
(Hab/km2) 
Surface 
(Km2) 
 
1 North- East 9799.55 7.6 3737246 101 36850
2 South - East 11176.13 6.4 2841362 79 35762
3 South 11012.69 6.8 3325576 97 34453
4 South - West 10706.75 7 2305913 79 29212
5 Vest 15646.31 5.3 1931759 60 32034
6 North - West 13023.63 3.9 2728967 80 34159
7 Centre 14190.47 6.8 2536211 74 34100
8 Bucharest- Ilfov 25170.21 2.7 2205393 1211 1821
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Table A4:  Characteristics of the regions - 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regions 
 
 
 
ONG 
/  
million 
Habitant 
ONG 
/ 
region 
 
Environmental
Penalties 
(Mille RON) 
 
Population 
with 
university  
studies 
Students 
/ 
1000 
habitant 
1 North- East 5 17 2628.28 9.4 21 
2 South - East 7 21 2781.27 10.4 17 
3 South 2 5 1251.55 8.9 12 
4 South - West 5 11 1762.81 11.1 19 
5 Vest 5 10 2400.67 13.2 37 
6 North - West 8 21 3545.71 10.7 33 
7 Centre 9 24 1922.86 12.1 27 
8 Bucharest- Ilfov 16 35 3775.01 30.2 95 
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